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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The evolving jurisprudence of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) is a fascinating phenomenon still in its early stages. That it
exists is testament to a recognition by the WTO's Member States that
a substantial ceding of national sovereignty to the WTO is necessary,
or at least advisable, in order to support an international mechanism
designed to facilitate and maintain orderly trade in goods and
services across national boundaries. This partial relinquishment of
jurisdiction, however, understandably has been accompanied by
certain misgivings and hedging by Member States individually and
particularly by the United States.
The boldness and tension underlying the political leap of faith
involved here are evident in the structure and working of the WTO's
dispute settlement system. Since its inception in 1947 the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has provided for dispute
settlement under Articles XXII and XXIII. 1 Experience with this
system over almost five decades, however, revealed a number of
structural flaws that eroded its utility and effectiveness. To one
degree or another, these shortcomings reflected an unwillingness by
the GATT's Contracting Parties more fully to empower the GATT as
an international organization.
By the time of the Uruguay Round, almost half a century
removed from World War II, the situation had changed significantly.
With global trade burgeoning, largely due to successive reductions in
tariffs under the GATT's auspices, the Uruguay Round's negotiations
in mid-April 1994 yielded an agreement establishing the WTO and a
slew of far-reaching and detailed multilateral trade agreements to
bolster open markets and curtail protectionism. To enforce and give
vitality to this expanded legal regime, a Dispute Settlement
2
Understanding (DSU) was crafted.
Building on and improving the GATT's system for settling
disputes, the DSU exhibits a greater resolve than previously by the
Member States to address dispositively conflicts arising from
interpretation and implementation of the WTO's many new,
substantive rules and requirements that entered into force for most of

1.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
2.
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 2, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 404 (1994)
[hereinafter RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND], 33. I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter
DSU].
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the world's countries on January 1, 1995. Thus, for example, the
DSU includes strict time limits to move the process along; provides
for review by an Appellate Body of panels' decisions on legal
questions; replaces the ability of the losing party to block the GATT
as a whole from adopting a panel's report with automatic adoption of
reports by panels and the Appellate Body unless there is a consensus
of the Member States against doing so; and sets guidelines for
prevailing parties to retaliate in the event of either non-compliance
with recommendations by a panel (or the Appellate Body) or of no
mutually satisfactory resolution. 3
These features of the DSU have been instrumental in
encouraging more frequent resort to dispute settlement under the
WTO than was true under the GATT. In the abstract, the DSU gives
promise of decisions carefully rendered and meaningfully carried out
within a reasonable timeframe. On the other hand, whether this
potential is realized depends to a considerable degree upon the
soundness and integrity of the legal reasoning expressed in each
decision reached under the DSU. Both to assist in this regard and to
guard against poorly considered opinions adversely affecting the
United States, the legislation executing the Uruguay Round's
agreements as U.S. domestic law contains various provisions that call
for Congress and the President to take a number of steps. 4 These
provisions require, for example:
(a)

annual reports from the United States Trade Representative
(USTR) to Congress on the status of completed and pending
5
dispute settlement proceedings;

(b)

(c)

consultations by USTR with the appropriate congressional
committees (principally the House Ways & Means Committee
and the Senate Finance Committee) 6 during dispute settlement
and thereafter regarding implementation of a panel or the
Appellate Body's recommendations; 7 and
five-year reports to Congress with USTR's analysis, inter alia, of
the costs and benefits to the United States of participating in the
WTO and the value of its continued participation in the WTO. 8

These requirements leave the impression that the United States
intends to monitor closely whether it is realizing the expected benefit
of its bargain with the WTO's other Member States--enforcement of
U.S. rights under the Uruguay Round's agreements in return for U.S.
assignment of what is essentially significant judicial authority to the

3.

Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Statement of Administrative Action. H.R.

Doc. No. 103-316, at 1008 (1994) [hereinafter SAA].
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

E.g., 19 U.S.C. §§ 3532-3538 (1994).

Id. § 3534(5)-(6).
Id. § 3531(3).
Id. §§ 3533(d)-(g), 3538.
Id. § 3535(a).
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WTO's Dispute Settlement Body (the Member States acting in
plenum).
It is against this backdrop that in separate, but related actions
the European Communities (EC) and Japan in mid-1998 and early
1999, respectively, requested formal consultations with the United
States regarding Title VIII of the U.S. Revenue Act of 1916 (the 1916
Act), 9 pursuant to Article 4 of the DSU, Article XXII:1 of the GATT
1994, and Article 17.2 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article
VI of the GATT 1994 (the Antidumping Agreement). 10 These
consultations did not lead to a mutually satisfactory resolution. The
formation of a three-person panel, comprised of the same individuals,
followed in each case. The report of the panel in the EC's complaint
was issued in United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916: Complaint
by the European Communities, WT/DS136/R (Mar. 31, 2000) (EC
Report)," while the report of the panel in Japan's complaint was
issued in United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916: Complaint by
Japan, WT/DS162/R (May 29, 2000) (Japan Report). 12 As the result
of appeals by the United States, the EC, and Japan of certain similar
legal questions, a single division of the WTO's Appellate Body was
assigned to hear and decide the appeals from both panel reports and
handed down its report in United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916,
WT/DS136/AB/R and WT/DS162/AB/R (Aug. 28, 2000) (Appellate
3
Body Report).'
At the heart of their complaints both the EC and Japan
contended that the 1916 Act per se and "as such"--apart from any
application of its provisions in a given case-violated various
obligations of the United States under the GATT 1994, chief among
them being Article VI along with related sections of the WTO's
Antidumping Agreement and Article 111:4." 4
For the reasons

9.
Pub. L. No. 64-271, 39 Stat. 756 (1916) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1994)).
10.
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 2, Annex 1A,
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 2, at 168.
11.
WTO Panel, United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916: Complaint by the
European Communities, WT/DS136fR (Mar. 31, 2000), at http://www.wto.orgl
english/tratop_e/dispu~e/distab_e.htm, 2000 WL 347837 [hereinafter EC Report].
12.
WTO Panel, United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916: Complaint by
Japan, WT/DS162/R (May 29, 2000), at http://www.wto.org/englishtratop-e/
dispu-e/distab_e.htm, 2000 WL 688018 [hereinafter Japan Report].
13.
WTO Appellate Body, United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916,
WT/DS136/AB/R,
WT/DS162/AB/R
(Aug. 28, 2000), at http://www.wto.org/
englishltratop_e/dispu~e/distab_e.htm, 2000 WL 1225267 [hereinafter Appellate Body
Report).
14.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.4; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.
6.13. Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 incorporates the rudimentary notion of national
treatment-that products imported into the territory of one contracting party from
another contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that
accorded to like products of the importing contracting party in terms of laws,
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specified below, the panel and Appellate Body in each dispute

settlement proceeding agreed that the 1916 Act of the United States
nullified or impaired benefits accruing to the other Member States
under the WTO's agreements. In the final analysis, the Appellate
Body recommended that the Dispute Settlement Body request the
United States to bring the 1916 Act into conformity with its
obligations under Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Antidumping
Agreement. 15 Notably, the panel in the Japanese challenge went so
far as to suggest that one way in which the United States could do so
would be to repeal the 1916 Act. 16 As logical as this observation is,
its importance should not be lost or obscured.
The invalidation under public international law of a U.S. federal
statute over eighty years old is a significant event by any measure,
especially because that pronouncement was made under the DSU and
the WTO's auspices, not by a court of the United States. It is true, of
course, as the SAA sets forth, that the DSU does not grant panels or
the Appellate Body the jurisdiction to direct a Member State to
amend its laws.1 7 As a practical matter, however, this distinction
loses at least some of its force in light of the fact that the DSU
authorizes panels and the Appellate Body through the Dispute
Settlement Body to judge and find a Member State's actions unlawful
in the first place, thus necessitating consideration by an unsuccessful
defending country of unpalatable responses. With so much at stake
and the U.S. sensibilities over national sovereignty in play, it appears
from their reports' deliberateness that the panel and Appellate Body
evaluating the 1916 Act were at pains to inspire as much confidence
as possible in their scholarship and balanced thoroughness and
thereby in the fairness of the DSU's adjudicatory system.

regulations and requirements affecting those products' internal sale, offering for sale,
purchase, transportation, distribution or use. Multilateral Agreements on Trade in
Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 2, Annex IA. RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 2, at 490, 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
15.
Appellate Body Report, supra note 13, para. 156.
16.
Japan Report, supranote 12, paras. 6.300-6.302.
17.
SAA, supra note 3, at 1008. How the United States chooses to respond in
this instance, consequently, is for the United States to decide. It may opt for repeal,
offer compensation, agree on some other action acceptable to the EC and Japan, or do
nothing and invite retaliation. See id. at 1009.
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18

A. PreliminaryIssues Considered By the Panel
In somewhat confusing fashion, for most of the last eighty years
the United States has had two antidumping statutes, the 1916 Act
and what originally was the Anti-Dumping Act of 1921,19 now found
in a much-expanded and revised form in Title VII of the Tariff Act of
1930.20 The 1930 Act's antidumping law is administered by the U.S.
Department of Commerce and the U.S. International Trade
Commission, largely mirrors Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the
WTO's Antidumping Agreement, and was not at issue in these cases.
It is the 1930 Act that is the statutory basis for virtually all
antidumping proceedings in the United States. On the other hand,
the 1916 Act is less well known and less frequently employed, and its
nature is open to dispute. Indeed, whether the 1916 Act is an
antitrust law, as the United States urged in these dispute settlement
proceedings, or an antidumping law subject to the discipline of Article
VI of the GATT 1994 and the Antidumping Agreement, as the EC and
Japan submitted, was the crux of the matter to be resolved.
Understandably, therefore, the EC Report and the Japan Report
devote considerable attention to the history and characteristics of the
1916 Act and, in the first instance, discuss the standards and
methodological framework for that evaluation.
Conscious of the "additional dimension" of the 1916 Act's
longevity, 21 the panel in each case emphasized

that objective

assessment of the facts called for an analysis of the terms of the 1916
Act and then, even if the text of the statute were clear on its face, to
look at its historical context, legislative history, and subsequent
declarations of U.S. authorities so as to understand the 1916 Act as it
has been and is actually understood and applied by the U.S. courts
and authorities. 22 Importantly, in examining the 1916 Act under this

Taken together, the EC Report, Japan Report, and Appellate Body Report
18.
total more than 400 pages of text. This commentary, accordingly, is not comprehensive
but attempts to summarize selectively the central aspects of these dispute settlement
proceedings.
19.
The Anti-Dumping Act of 1921 was codified through 1979 as 19 U.S.C.
§§ 60-71.
20.
19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677n [hereinafter 1930 Act].
21.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.41; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.
6.47.
22.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.48; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.
6.57.
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procedure, the panel determined that it need not accept at face value
the characterization attached by the United States to the law, but
was free to analyze the operation of the domestic legislation 23 and,
while not independently interpreting U.S. law, to weigh the
jurisprudence of municipal U.S. courts if the relevant judgments were
uncertain or divided. 24 With respect to the historical context of the
1916 Act, the panel decided that it would "pay attention" to the
statute's legislative history as appropriate, that it should not "lose
sight of' the state of antitrust and trade law concepts at the time of
the 1916 Act's enactment, and that public declarations and studies of
23
the period might be relevant as well.
As a second preliminary issue, the panel in each case grappled
with "whether the 1916 Act could, by its nature, fall within the scope
of Article VI only, of Article H1:4 only, or partly or wholly within the
scope of both."26 Relying on European Communities-Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas27 and Case
28
Concerningthe Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France,
the panel was guided in answering this question by the general
principle of international law "that, when applying a body of norms to
a given factual situation, one should consider that factual situation
under the norm which most specifically addresses it."29 Noting the
parties' agreement that the 1916 Act deals with transnational price
discrimination, the panel correctly deemed Article III:4's focus on
internal national treatment for imports less specific than Article VI's
scope as to transnational price discrimination. 30 The panel therefore
31
proceeded to review the applicability of Article VI to the 1916 Act.
In regard to a third preliminary issue, the panel in each case
considered the relationship between Article VI of the GATT 1994 and
the Antidumping Agreement. On this score, the United States
argued that only definitive antidumping duties, acceptance of price

23.

EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.51; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.

6.60.
24.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.53; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.
6.62.
25.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.60; Japan Report. supra note 12. para.
6.69.
26.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.71. See also Japan Report, supra note 12,
para. 6.79.
27.

WTO Appellate Body, European Communities-Regime for the Importation,

Sale and Distribution of Bananas, para. 204, WT/DS27ABR (Sept. 25, 1997), at
http-/ww.wto.orgenglish/tratope/dispuieldistab-e.htm.
28.
(Fr. v. Serb.) 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 20121, at 5, 30 (July 12).

29.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.76 & n.344; Japan Report, supra note 12,
para. 6.85 & n.70.
30.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.78; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.
6.86
31.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.81; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.
6.87.
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undertakings, and provisional measures may be challenged under
Article 17.4 of the Antidumping Agreement. Further, according to
the United States, the panel was without jurisdiction to decide a
claim under Article VI because that article does not apply
independently to a dispute in which the Antidumping Agreement
32
does not apply.
While addressing nominally preliminary matters, these portions
of the EC Report and Japan Report are critical in setting the tone
and direction of the panel's thinking. In short order, the panel
rejected the jurisdictional charges of the United States. First, the
panel commented, the dispute settlement provisions in Article 17 of
the Antidumping Agreement do not replace the DSU as a "coherent
33
system" of dispute settlement for the Antidumping Agreement.
Nothing in Article 17.4 expressly limits the DSU's scope of
application except in relation to the specific issue of Member States'
antidumping actions. 34 Moreover, the panel continued, this reading
of Article 17 and the DSU is confirmed also by Article 18.4 of the
Antidumping Agreement, pursuant to which each Member State is
bound to take all necessary steps to ensure, by the date of entry into
force of the WTO Agreement for the given Member State, the
conformity of its laws, regulations, and administrative procedures
with the Antidumping Agreement. Thus, the panel concluded:
[A] Member's anti-dumping legislation must be compatible with the
WTO Agreement continuously, whether that legislation is applied or
not. If dispute settlement could be initiated in relation to some specific
anti-dumping action only, i.e. if the conformity of a domestic antidumping law could only be reviewed when that law is applied, the
provisions of Article 18.4 would be deprived of their meaning and useful
effect. A Member could maintain a WTO-incompatible law in total
impunity as long as none of the measures referred to in Article 17.4 is
35
adopted.

On the topic of the relationship between Article VI of the GATT
1994 and the Antidumping Agreement, the panel in the Japan Report
observed that the two are part of the same treaty, the WTO
Agreement, and so, by implication under Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 36 constitute an "inseparable
package of rights and obligations" such that "Article VI should not be

32.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 5.15; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.
6.89.
33.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 5.21; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.
6.95.
34.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 5.24; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.
6.98.
35.
Japan Report, supra note 12, para. 6.99. See also EC Report, supra note 11,
para. 5.25.
36.
U.N. Doc. AICONF. 39/27 (1969), May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into
force Jan. 27, 1980).
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interpreted in a way that would deprive either Article VI or the AntiDumping Agreement of meaning."37 While the panel felt that it could
make findings under Article VI without simultaneously having to
make findings under the Antidumping Agreement, and vice versa, it
stressed that the inseparability of the two required the panel to
interpret the provisions invoked by Japan so as to give meaning to all
of them.38

With the stage set and the decks cleared, the panel in each case
was ready to proceed to the parties' remaining legal issues.
B. The Panel'sEvaluationof Applicability
In its defense, the United States took the position that the 1916
Act does not fall within the scope of Article VI of the GATT 1994 or
the Antidumping Agreement. According to the United States, Article
VI should be construed narrowly as applying only when a Member
State addresses injurious dumping merely by means of offsetting
antidumping duties levied at the border, whereas the 1916 Act is
concerned with punishing dumping having predatory intent through
39
the imposition of damages on importers.

In rejecting this view, the panel began by finding that dumping
exists under Article VI when there is a price difference between like
products sold in two different national markets, ith the price in the
country to which the product is exported being less than the price in
the producing country or a third country to which the product is
exported. 40 Likewise, the panel determined, the 1916 Act's text
contains a price discrimination test very similar to the requirement of
Article VI-a comparison between two prices, one in the United
States and the other in the country of production or a third country
where the product is also sold. 41
Furthermore, in the panel's
judgment, the predatory intent specified as an element in the 1916
Act does not affect the 1916 Act's requirement of a price difference
between the referent markets, a basic requirement identical to that
in Article V1. 4 2 More precisely, the panel determined, the type of
prices on which the 1916 Act is based satisfies the criteria of the
prices relied upon in Article VI and the Antidumping Agreement,

37.
38.
39.
6.120.
40.
6.127.
41.
6.129.
42.
6.135.

Japan Report, supranote 12, para. 6.103 (footnote omitted).
Japan Report, supranote 12, para. 6.104.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.94; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.104; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.108; Japan Report, supra note 12, par.
EC Report, supra note 11, par. 6.113; Japan Report, supra note 12, par.
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and, thus, "the 1916 Act addresses the same type of price
43
discrimination as Article VI of the GATT 1994."
The panel next explored the allegation of the United States that
Article VI's disciplines are applicable only to the extent that a
Member State intends to address material injury, threat thereof, or
material retardation of the establishment of a domestic industry by
reason of dumping. 44 On the strength of Articles 1 and 18.1 of the
Antidumping Agreement, which direct that antidumping measures
can be applied only under the circumstances described in Article VI
and are limited in accordance with the GATT 1994's provisions, the
panel expressed as its view that the transnational price
discrimination targeted in the 1916 Act is subject to the disciplines of
45
Article VI and the Antidumping Agreement.
Moreover, the fact that the 1916 Act may be seen in U.S. law as
an antitrust statute with an antitrust purpose does not cause the
1916 Act to fall outside Article VI's scope, observed the panel, as long
as the 1916 Act's transnational price discrimination test is and has
been understood in such a way as to meet Article VI's definition of
dumping. 4 6 In this connection, again recalling the need to take into
account that the 1916 Act was over eighty years old, the panel went
on to consider the U.S. claim that the nature of the 1916 Act as an
antitrust statute outside Article VI's scope is clear from the historical
47
context, legislative history, and case law interpreting the 1916 Act.
Suffice to say this survey by the panel is quite thorough and
lengthy. 48 In the end, the evidence from these supplementary
sources reinforced, and did not detract from, the panel's
understanding of the 1916 Act's price discrimination test on the basis
of that statute's text. Thus, the relevant historical context and
legislative history confirmed for the panel that the practice addressed
by the 1916 Act was construed at the time to be "dumping" as defined
today4 9 and that antidumping and antitrust laws dealing with
predatory pricing both were part of the notion of "unfair competition"

43.
Japan Report, supra note 12, para. 6.138. See also EC Report, supra note
11, para. 6.118.
44.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.114; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.
6.142.
45.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.115; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.
6.143.
46.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.117; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.
6.145.
47.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.119; Japan Report, supra note 12, paras.
6.149-6.150.
48.
EC Report, supra note 11, paras. 6.120-6.162; Japan Report, supra note 12,
paras. 6.151-6.191.
49.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.122; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.
6.154.
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when the 1916 Act was passed into law. 50 In addition, from its
overview of the relatively small body of pertinent U.S. case law, the
panel (a) found no unambiguous authority from the U.S. Supreme
Court that the 1916 Act was definitively an antitrust or antidumping
instrument,5 1 and (b) read the opinions of the lower federal courts to
signify that those courts considered the 1916 Act's transnational
price discrimination test to be "dumping" within the meaning of
52
international and U.S. trade law.
At this stage of its deliberations, therefore, the panel in each
case had reached the following findings:
(a)

(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

the 1916 Act's text incorporates a test for transnational price

discrimination that falls within the definition of "dumping" in
Article VI of the GATT 1994;
none of the 1916 Act's additional conditions or requirements
causes the 1916 Act's test for transnational price discrimination
to fall outside that definition;
there is no convincing evidence in the 1916 Act's legislative
history to conclude otherwise;
U.S. federal courts' decisions have not interpreted the 1916 Act's
test for transnational price discrimination in such a way that the
test no longer meets Article Vrs definition of dumping; and
the Antidumping Agreement's link and inseparability with
Article VI implies as well the applicability of the Antidumping
53
Agreement to the 1916 Act.

C. The Panel'sFindingof Mandatory Law
Having determined that the 1916 Act falls within the scope of
Article VI and the Antidumping Act, the panel in each case went on
to weigh the U.S. argument that the 1916 Act is non-mandatory
legislation, that is, that the 1916 Act has been and in the future can
be interpreted by U.S. courts and applied by the U.S. Department of
Justice in its discretion so as to be consistent with the U.S.
obligations under the WTO.5 4 In rejecting this contention, the panel
referred to Article 18.4 of the Antidumping Agreement once more,
quoting it in full:
Each Member shall take all necessary steps, of a general or particular

character, to ensure, no later than the date of entry into force of the

50.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.131; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.
6.159.
51.
EC Report, supranote 11, paras. 6.135.6.139; Japan Report, supra note 12,
paras. 6.163-6.167.
52.
EC Report, supra note 11, paras. 6.140-6.146, 6.151; Japan Report, supra
note 12, paras. 6.168-6.175.
53.
EC Report, supranote 11, paras. 6.163.6.165; Japan Report, supra note 12,
paras. 6.192-6.194.
54.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.82; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.
6.195.
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WTO Agreement for it, the conformity of its laws, regulations and
administrative practices with the provisions of this Agreement, as they
55
may apply to the Member in question.

Acknowledging that public international law generally
recognizes the concept of "mandatory/non-mandatory legislation," the
panel in the Japan Report concluded that as a treaty provision
Article 18.4 prevails over customary international law. 5 6 The panel
in each case ruled that Article 18.4 requires the 1916 Act to be in
conformity with the Antidumping Agreement as of its entry into force
for the United States; that to interpret Article 18.4 differently would
undermine that article's obligations and be contrary to the general
principle of effectiveness; and that the 1916 Act accordingly cannot be
57
considered to be a "non-mandatory" law.
D. Applicability of Article VI and the Antidumping Agreement
In drawing this portion of its report to a close, the panel in each
case took care to underscore that its interpretation of the terms of
Article VI and the Antidumping Agreement had been objective and
did not dispute the fact that the U.S. courts and authorities in good
faith may consider the 1916 Act to be a statute that addresses
antitrust issues. 58 At the same time, in response to the U.S. warning
that the panel's interpretation was so broad as to risk making Article
VI applicable to all antitrust laws, the panel in each case observed
that it had acted consistently with its mandate of reviewing the 1916
Act's conformity with the WTO Agreement's provisions and that it
had not been assigned the task of considering the general issue of the
relationship between trade law and antitrust law. 59 Moreover, the
panel thought the likelihood very limited that its findings with
respect to Article VI's transnational price discrimination would affect
application of Member States' antitrust laws, both because that
discrimination is narrowly defined and does not include price
discrimination within a given jurisdiction's territory and because

55.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.168. See also Japan Report, supra note
12, para. 6.196.
56.
Japan Report, supra note 12, para. 6.199 (citing Military and Paramilitary
Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 137 (June 27)).
57.
EC Report, supra note 11, paras. 6.168-6.170; Japan Report, supra note 12,

paras. 6.199-6.202.
58.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.172; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.
6.203.
59.
EC Report, supra note 11, paras. 6.171-6.172; Japan Report, supra note 12,
para. 6.205.
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transnational price discrimination by itself is unlikely
60
sanctionable under antitrust laws.

to be

E. The Panel's Findingof Violations
The 1916 Act calls for damages, fines, or imprisonment as
penalties for infractions of its terms. 61 Both the EC and Japan thus
argued that the 1916 Act violates Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994, as
confirmed by Article 18.1 of the Antidumping Agreement, on the
ground that these articles authorize antidumping duties as the sole
measure permitted in response to dumping. 62 In rebuttal, the United
States advanced the view that there is no violation, because Article
VI and the Antidumping Agreement govern just those laws and
measures that seek to counteract injurious dumping by means of the
imposition of antidumping duties and that Article VI:2's directivethat antidumping duties "may" be levied to offset or prevent
63
dumping-is permissive and unqualified.
With reference again to the interpretative rules of Article 31 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,6 4 the panel set about
clarifying Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 so as to ensure a harmonious
meaning to both Article VI:2 and Article 18.1 of the Antidumping
Agreement in resolving whether the 1916 Act violates these two
65
articles by providing for sanctions other than antidumping duties.
As quoted by the panel, the first sentence of Article VI:2 reads: "In
order to offset or prevent dumping, a contracting party may levy on
any dumped product an anti-dumping duty not greater in amount
than the margin of dumping in respect of such product."66
Article 18.1 of the Antidumping Agreement correspondingly
states, "No specific action against dumping of exports from another
Member can be taken except in accordance with the provisions of
67
GATT 1994, as interpreted by this Agreement."

60.
EC Report, supra note 11, paras. 6.173-6.176; Japan Report, supra note 12,
paras. 6.206-6.209.
61.
15 U.S.C. § 72.
62.
EC Report, supra note 11, paras. 6.183-6.184; Japan Report, supra note 12.
para. 6.217.
63.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.185; Japan Report. supra note 12, paras.
6.212, 6.218.
64.
See supranote 36 and accompanying text.
65.
EC Report, supra note 11, paras. 6.185.6.186; Japan Report, supra note 12,
paras. 6.214-6.216.
66.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.188; Japan Report. supra note 12, para.
6.220.
67.
EC Report, supra note 11, par. 6.193; Japan Report, supra note 12, paras.
6.214, 6.225. Footnote 24 to Article 18.1 of the Antidumping Agreement states: 1rhis is
not intended to preclude action under other relevant provisions of GATT 1994, as
appropriate." Japan Report, supranote 12, para. 6.225.
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The panel in each case looked first to the ordinary meaning of
Article VI:2's language, focusing on the use of "may levy" as making
the imposition of antidumping duties facultative and limiting the
amount of such duties in any event to the margin of dumping.6 8 As
construed by the panel, therefore, the word "may" allowed Member
States a choice between levying an antidumping duty equal to or less
than the dumping margin, but not between antidumping duties and
other measures. 69 Had Article VI:2 been designed to allow other
measures of the sort encompassed by the 1916 Act, the panel
reasoned that "[i]t would have been logical to list the other possible
sanctions, especially if those sanctions could be more severe than the
imposition of offsetting duties. '70 The panel thus concluded that the
ordinary meaning of Article VI:2's terms supports the view that
antidumping duties are the only remedy allowed by Article VI of the
GATT 1994.71
The panel next considered the context of Article VI:2, especially
Article 18.1 of the Antidumping Agreement and its footnote 24.72
According to the United States, footnote 24 envisions application of
measures against dumping other than antidumping duties as long as
those measures are consistent with the GATT 1994. In addition, in
the U.S. judgment, if the measure is not regulated by the GATT 1994,
as is the case with the 1916 Act, the measure is a fortiori in accord
with the GATT 1994. 7 3 While noting that footnote 24 does not
prevent Member States from addressing the causes or effects of
dumping through other policy instruments allowed by the WTO
Agreement or from adopting other measures compatible with the
WTO Agreement, the panel dismissed the U.S. argument as being at
odds with Article VI, inasmuch as Member States could then address
"dumping" without having to respect Article VI or the Antidumping
74
Agreement.
Finally, the panel in each case explored whether the preparatory
work leading to Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 reinforces the view
that Article VI:2 permits only antidumping duties to offset dumping.
In particular, the panel cited a passage from a 1948 Report on Article

68.
6.222.
69.
6.221.
70.
supranote
71.
6.222.
72.
73.
6.227.
74.
6.228.

EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.190; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.189; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.190 (footnote omitted); Japan Report,
12, para. 6.222 (footnote omitted).
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.190; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.
See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.198; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.199; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.
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VI by a Working Party, indicating that measures other than
compensatory antidumping duties may not be applied to counteract
dumping except as otherwise permitted by other provisions of the
GATT. 75 Attempting to build on this legislative history, the United
States urged that other measures can consequently be legally applied
against dumping, such as raising unbound tariffs, tariff
renegotiation, safeguard measures, or countervailing measures. 78 In
response, the panel agreed these measures might be legally applied,
but observed that the basis for their imposition would not objectively
be "dumping" as defined by Article VI, but rather would be the causes
or effects of the dumping. Thus, an increase of unbound tariffs, tariff
renegotiation, or safeguard measures would apply on a most-favorednation basis under Article I of the GATT 1994, clearly inappropriate
responses unless all Member States were dumping. 7" Countervailing
duties would likewise be unacceptable, as such duties can only be
78
employed to counteract subsidies.
Based upon its analysis of Article VL:2's text, its context with
reference particularly to Article 18.1 of the Antidumping Agreement,
and the preparatory work underlying Article VI:2, therefore, the
panel in each case concluded that Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994
contemplates that only antidumping duties may be applied to offset
dumping as such and that by providing for fines, imprisonment, and
79
treble damages for this purpose the 1916 Act violates Article VI:2.
F. Remainder of the Panel Reports
As recounted above, the substantive core of the panel report in
each case consists of the twin findings that (1) the 1916 Act falls
within the scope of Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Antidumping
Agreement, and (2) the 1916 Act with its sanctions of fines,
imprisonment, and treble damages violates the requirement of
Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 and Article 18.1 of the Antidumping
Agreement that antidumping duties are the exclusive remedy for
dumping. These matters were the principal ones raised and resolved
by the panel in each case, but several others and their treatment by
the panel are worth mentioning. The panel's guideline at this
juncture was whether additional findings would assist the Dispute
Settlement Body in rendering "sufficiently precise recommendations

75.
6.237.
76.
6.238.

EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.201; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.202; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.

77.

Id.

78.
79.

Id.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.204; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.

6.240.
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and rulings" that would facilitate prompt compliance by the United
States. To the extent it deemed addressing these further claims to be
unnecessary, the panel exercised its right to judicial economy not to
do so. 80
Thus, for example, both the EC and Japan contended that the
1916 Act's standard-that there be an intent to destroy or injure a
U.S. industry or to prevent its establishment-was not compatible
with the criterion to apply antidumping duties in Article VI:1 of the
GATT 1994 and Article 3 of the Antidumping Agreement that
dumping cause or threaten to cause material injury to a U.S. industry
or threaten to retard its establishment. 8 ' Remarking that proving
"intent" under the 1916 Act may be more difficult than proving actual
injury under Article VI:1, and that the existence of "intent" may not
always require or imply the existence of actual injury, actual threat
of injury, or actual retardation,8 2 the panel concluded that the 1916
Act with its provision for identification of "intent" is not compatible
with the injury requirements of Article VI:1.A3 Given that Article 3 of
the Antidumping Agreement addresses "material injury" in greater
detail, the panel found it unnecessary to make specific findings under

Article

3.84

Likewise, the panel considered and agreed with arguments by
the EC and Japan that the 1916 Act violates a number of procedural
and due process requirements contained in Articles 4 and 5 of the
Antidumping Agreement. 85 More precisely, Articles 4 and 5 stipulate
that an antidumping petition must be filed on behalf of, and be
supported by, a minimum proportion of the domestic industry, while
Article 5.5 directs that notice be given to the exporting country's
government before an antidumping proceeding is commenced. In
contrast, the 1916 Act allows suit by "any person injured in his
business or property" and includes no direction for such notice to the
foreign government concerned. 8 6 The panel accordingly found the
1916 Act violative of Articles 4 and 5 of the Antidumping Agreement

80.
EC Report, supra note 11, para.
6.244.
81.
EC Report, supra note 11, para.
6.261.
82.
EC Report, supra note 11, para.
6.252.
83.
EC Report, supra note 11, para.
6.263.
84.
EC Report, supra note 11, para.
6.264.
85.
EC Report, supra note 11, paras.
para. 6.265.
86.
EC Report, supra note 11, para.
6.267.

6.207; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.
6.178; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.
6.180; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.
6.181; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.
6.211; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.
6.212, 6.215; Japan Report, supra note 12,
6.213; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.
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in these respects8 7 and, therefore, of Article 1 of the Antidumping
Agreement as well, which sets forth that antidumping investigations
are to be initiated and conducted in accordance with the
88
Antidumping Agreement's provisions.
Finally, after foregoing making findings and thereby exercising
judicial economy as to alleged violations of Article HI:4 of the GATT
1994 (on national treatment)8 9 and of Article XI of the GATT 1994
(concerning impermissible prohibitions or restrictions on imports
other than duties, taxes or other charges),90 the panel in each case
found that, by violating Articles VI:A and VI:2 of the GATT 1994, the
1916 Act also violates Article XVI:4 of the Agreement Establishing
the WTO. 91 Article XVI:4 states that "[e]ach Member shall ensure
the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures
with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements."9 2
Along much the same lines, by violating various articles of the
Antidumping Agreement, including Articles 1, 4, 5, and 18, the panel
in the Japan Report found that the 1916 Act violates Article 18.4 of
93
the Antidumping Agreement.
G. Nullification or Impairmentand Recommendations By the Panel
On the strength of its findings regarding the violations
attributable to the 1916 Act, and absent rebuttal by the United
States, the panel concluded that the 1916 Act nullifies or impairs
benefits accruing to the European Communities and Japan under the
WTO Agreement.9 4
The panel in each case consequently
recommended in traditional fashion that the Dispute Settlement
Body request that the United States bring the 1916 Act into
conformity with its obligations under the WTO Agreement.9 5 As
noted earlier, however,9 6 the panel in Japan's challenge also took the

87.
EC Report, supra note 11, paras. 6.213-6.216; Japan Report, supra note 12,
paras. 6.267, 6.271.
88.
EC Report, supra note 11, paras. 6.208, 6.217; Japan Report, supra note 12.
para. 6.274.
89.
EC Report, supra note 11, paras. 6.218-6.220; Japan Report, supra note 12,
paras. 6.275-6.282.
90.
Japan Report, supra note 12, paras. 6.283-6.291.
91.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.225; Japan Report. supra note 12, para.
6.298.
92.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.222; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.
6.294.
93.
Japan Report, supra note 12, para. 6.298.
94.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 6.227; Japan Report, supra note 12, para.
6.299(g).
95.
EC Report, supra note 11, para. 7.2; Japan Report, supra note 12, paras.
6.300-6.302.
96.
See supranote 16 and accompanying text.
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uncommon step of suggesting that repeal of the 1916 Act would be
one way for the United States to accomplish this conformity. 97 The
panel made this suggestion at Japan's request and after citing Article
19.1 of the DSU, which contemplates suggestions by a panel on ways
for its recommendations to be implemented, and Article 3.7 of the
DSU, which in its fourth sentence observes that withdrawal of
measures found to be in violation of agreements under the WTO is
the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism if the parties
cannot agree on a mutually acceptable solution otherwise. 98

III. THE APPELLATE BODY REPORT
Not surprisingly, the United States exercised its prerogative and
appealed a number of legal issues from the panel's EC Report and
Japan Report. 99 As described below, the Appellate Body upheld the
panel in all respects.
A. Jurisdiction
The United States first renewed its contention that the panel did
not have jurisdiction to review the conformity of the 1916 Act as such
under the Antidumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994.
In response to the EC's claim that the U.S. argument was untimely
because not raised until the stage of the panel's interim review in the
EC's case, the Appellate Body concurred that the interim review was
not an appropriate stage for this objection to have been made by the
United States, but felt this issue of jurisdiction was one that the
panel rightly considered was of a nature that it could be addressed at
any time. In the Appellate Body's words: 'The vesting of jurisdiction
in a panel is a fundamental prerequisite for lawful panel
proceedings."' 100
With respect to the U.S. argument that Article 17.4 of the
Antidumping Agreement, as interpreted by Guatemala-Anti-

97.
Japan Report, supra note 12, para. 6.302.
98.
Id. paras. 6.300-6.302.
99.
The EC and Japan also appealed certain issues, the main ones being:
(1) the panel's refusal to grant "enhanced" third-party rights to Japan in the EC's case
and to the EC in Japan's case and (2) in the event the Appellate Body reversed the
panel's substantive findings on the 1916 Act's violations of Article VI, whether the 1916
Act is inconsistent with Articles 111:4 and XI of the GATT 1994. Appellate Body Report,
supra note 13, para. 50(d)-(e). These issues are tangential to the thrust of the
Appellate Body Report and, therefore, are not further discussed here.
100.
Id. para. 54.
The Appellate Body noted extensive authority in this
connection for the widely accepted rule that an international tribunal is entitled to
consider the issue of its own jurisdiction on its own initiative. Id. para. 54 & n.30.
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Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico, 10 1
envisions claims of inconsistency only as to the three antidumping
measures enumerated in Article 17.4-definitive antidumping duty, a
price undertaking, or, in some circumstances, a provisional
measure-the Appellate Body initially looked to the practice of
panels under Article XXIII of the GATT 1947, whereby panels
consistently found jurisdiction to deal with claims against legislation
as such. 0 2 "In examining such claims, panels developed the concept
that mandatory and discretionary legislation should be distinguished
from each other, reasoning that only legislation that mandates a
violation of GATT obligations can be found as such to be inconsistent
10 3
with those obligations."
The Appellate Body next noted that, consistent with the
affirmance in the DSU's Article 3.1 of the principles for managing
disputes under Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1947, panels
under the WTO's DSU also have dealt with claims brought against
Member States' legislation as such, independently from the
10 4
legislation's application in a specific instance.
Moving on to Article 17 of the Antidumping Agreement, the
Appellate Body analogized that, in the same way that Article XXIII of
the GATT 1994 allows challenges to legislation as such, so Article 17
should be similarly understood unless Article 17 expressly or
implicitly directs to the contrary. Finding nothing in Article 17 or the
rest of the Antidumping Agreement that expressly bars examination
of legislation as such, 10 5 the Appellate Body then parsed Article 17
for any implicit restriction to this effect and found none. 10 6 As for
Guatemala Cement, the Appellate Body recalled that Mexico had
challenged Guatemala's initiation of antidumping proceedings and its
conduct of the investigation, but had done so without identifying any
of the several measures listed as actionable in Article 17.4 of the
Antidumping Agreement. 10 7
Under these circumstances, the
Appellate Body explained, it had found simply that Mexico must
identify one of Article 17.4's measures in order to proceed with its
challenge of Guatemala's initiation and conduct of the antidumping
investigation and had not precluded review of antidumping
legislation as such.10 8 Even as it recognized that Article 17.4

101.
WVTO Appellate Body, Guatemala-Anti.DumpingInvestigation Regarding
Portland Cement from Mexico, WT/DS601AB!R (Nov. 2, 1998), at httplww'.v.
wto.orglengllshltratopedispueldistabe.htm [hereinafter Guatemala Cement).
102.
Appellate Body Report, supra note 13, para. 60.
103.
Id.
104.
Id. para. 61.
105.
Id. para. 62.
106.
Id. paras. 63-75.
107.
Id. para. 71.
108.
Id. para. 72.
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balances a complaining Member State's right to seek redress with the
risk that a responding Member State's antidumping investigation
might otherwise be repeatedly disrupted by dispute settlement
proceedings,10 9 the Appellate Body reinforced that a Member State
may challenge the consistency of any preceding action taken by an
investigating authority in an antidumping investigation once one of
Article 17.4's measures is identified in the request for establishment
of a panel. 110
Along with finding that Article 17.4 does not address or affect a
Member State's right to bring a claim of inconsistency with the
Antidumping Agreement against antidumping legislation as such,"'
the Appellate Body buttressed its affirmative finding of jurisdiction
by pointing in turn to Articles 18.4 and 18.1 of the Antidumping
Agreement. As summarized by the Appellate Body, Article 18.4
imposes an affirmative obligation on each Member State to bring its
legislation into conformity with the Antidumping Agreement by the
date of the WTO Agreement's entry into force for that Member State
and nowhere excludes that obligation from the scope of matters that
may be submitted for dispute settlement. 112 As for Article 18.1, the
Appellate Body described its broad prohibition on specific actions
against dumping unless such actions are in accordance with the
GATT 1994 and the Antidumping Agreement. The Appellate Body
found nothing in Article 18.1 or elsewhere in the Antidumping
Agreement to suggest that the consistency of such actions may only
be challenged when one of the three measures specified in Article
13
17.4 has been adopted.
For these reasons, the Appellate Body confirmed the EC and
Japan's right to bring dispute settlement claims of inconsistency with
Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Antidumping Agreement
against the 1916 Act as such.
B. Mandatory and DiscretionaryLegislation
In appealing the panel's conclusion that the 1916 Act is
mandatory legislation, the United States reiterated its view that the
1916 Act is non-mandatory or discretionary legislation, and so not
reviewable as such, because U.S. courts have interpreted in the past
and could interpret in the future the 1916 Act in a manner consistent
with the U.S. WTO obligations, and because the U.S. Department of
Justice has discretion in determining whether to initiate criminal

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. para.
Id. para.
Id. para.
Id. para.
Id. para.

73 & n.38.
73 & n.39.
74.
78.
81.
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proceedings under the 1916 Act. Citing United States-Measures
Affecting the Importation, Internal Sale and Use of Tobacco,114 the
Appellate Body recalled that discretion vested in the executive
branch of government is the relevant discretion to distinguish
between mandatory and discretionary legislation. 115
Adhering to this yardstick, the Appellate Body concurred writh
the panel's decision that the 1916 Act is mandatory for a series of
reasons:
(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

With respect to civil actions under the 1916 Act, such
actions are brought by private parties so that there is no
relevant discretion accorded to the executive branch of the
116
U.S. government in this area.
With respect to criminal actions under the 1916 Act, the
U.S. Department of Justice's discretion to prosecute or not
is not of such a nature or such breadth as to transform the
117
1916 Act into discretionary legislation.
In finding the U.S. Department of Justice's discretion in
criminal cases does not mean that the 1916 Act is
discretionary legislation, the Appellate Body rejected the
U.S. argument that the panel had ruled that the
mandatory/discretionary distinction is relevant only if the
challenged legislation has never been applied. 118
The Appellate Body also concluded that the panel had
correctly articulated and applied the burden of proof in each
case by finding that the European Communities and Japan
had established a prima facie case that the 1916 Act on its
face is inconsistent with Article VI of the GATT 1994 and
the Antidumping Agreement and by then examining and
deeming unpersuasive the U.S. arguments and evidence to
119
rebut this prima facie case.
The 1916 Act cannot be discretionary legislation based upon
its interpretation by the United States' courts, because the
mandatory/discretionary distinction relies upon the
120
executive branch's discretion, not action by the judiciary.

C. Applicability of Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Antidumping

Agreement to the 1916 Act
As had the panel in each case, so the Appellate Body devoted

considerable attention to the question whether the 1916 Act is within
the scope of Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Antidumping
Agreement. In renewing its argument that the panel had erred as a

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Oct. 4, 1994, GATT B.I.S.D. (41st Supp.) at 131 (1997), 1994 WL 910938.
Appellate Body Report, supra note 13, para. 88.
Id. para. 90.
Id. para. 91.
Id. paras. 92-93.
Id. paras. 94-97.
Id. para. 100.
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matter of law in making an affirmative finding in this regard, the
United States emphasized that Article VI applies to a Member State's
domestic legislation only when that law imposes antidumping duties
and specifically targets dumping as defined in Article VI:1. By virtue
of providing for imprisonment, fines, and treble damages (not
antidumping duties) and of addressing predatory pricing (not
U.S. view falls outside Article VI and
dumping), the 1916 Act in the
121
the Antidumping Agreement.
In response, the Appellate Body framed the issue as depending
on whether Article VI regulates all possible measures Member States
can take against dumping or only the imposition of antidumping
duties and neither prohibits nor governs other measures that
After
Member States may take to counteract dumping. 122
scrutinizing Article VI:2's wording that Member States "may levy"
antidumping duties, the Appellate Body opined that this text by itself
does not specify that only antidumping duties can be imposed to
offset or prevent dumping. 123 The Appellate Body continued,
however, Article VI:2-read in conjunction with the Antidumping
Agreement's provisions-is properly understood as giving Member
States a choice between imposing an antidumping duty or not and a
choice between imposing an antidumping duty equal to or less than
the margin of dumping. In this respect, the Appellate Body relied on
Article 9 of the Antidumping Agreement and its language along these
lines. 124 Moreover, the Appellate Body stressed, Article 18.1 of the
Antidumping Agreement prohibits any "specific action against
dumping" unless that action is in accordance with Article VI of the
GATT 1994.125

The Appellate Body next turned to whether the 1916 Act
provides for "specific action against dumping" and thus is covered by
Article VI. Again noting the U.S. contention that the 1916 Act
targets predatory pricing, the Appellate Body reviewed the relevant
portions of the 1916 Act and concluded:
The constituent elements of "dumping" are built into the essential
elements of civil and criminal liability under the 1916 Act. The wording

of the 1916 Act also makes clear that these actions can be taken only
with respect to conduct which presents the constituent elements of
"dumping." It follows that the civil and criminal proceedings and
penalties provided for in the 1916 Act are "specific action against
dumping." We find, therefore, that Article VI of the GATT 1994 applies
126
to the 1916 Act.

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. para. 104.
Id. para. 109.
Id. para. 111.
Id. paras. 114-116.
Id. paras. 124-126.
Id. para. 130.
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Furthermore, the 1916 Act's prerequisite of intent to destroy or
injure an American industry was construed by the Appellate Body as
not transforming the 1916 Act into a law that does not provide for
"specific action against dumping."'127 For all these reasons, and
agreeing with the panel on the inseparable relationship between
Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Antidumping Agreement, the
Appellate Body found both to apply to the 1916 Act. 128
D. The Appellate Body's Conclusions
Insofar as the panel found that the 1916 Act is inconsistent with
Articles VI:1 and VI:2 of the GATT 1994 and with various articles of
the Antidumping Agreement, the United States argued before the
Appellate Body that the panel had erred, but made this claim solely
on the basis that the 1916 Act does not fall within the scope of
application of Article VI and the Antidumping Agreement. Having
rejected this underlying position by the United States, the Appellate
129
Body upheld the panel's findings of these inconsistencies as well.
Similarly, the United States urged that the panel's finding was
incorrect that the 1916 Act is inconsistent with Article VI:2, because
Article VI:2 regulates only the imposition of antidumping duties and
not other measures to counter dumping. Recalling that Article VI:2
and the Antidumping Agreement limit the permissible responses to
dumping to definitive antidumping duties, provisional measures, and
price undertakings, the Appellate Body affirmed the panel's
conclusion that the 1916 Act is inconsistent with Article VI:2 and the
Antidumping Agreement by virtue of providing for "specific action
against dumping" in the form of civil and criminal proceedings and
penalties. 130
E. The Appellate Body's Recommendation
Without specifying or suggesting how, the Appellate Body
concluded by recommending that the Dispute Settlement Body
request that the United States bring the 1916 Act into conformity
with U.S. obligations under Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the
Antidumping Agreement.13

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

para. 132.
para. 133.
paras. 134-135.
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IV. CONCLUSION

On September 26, 2000, the Dispute Settlement Body adopted
the Appellate Body Report and the EC and the Japan Reports as
upheld by the Appellate Body. 132 Thereafter, on October 23, 2000,
the United States informed the Dispute Settlement Body of its
intention
to
implement
the
Dispute
Settlement
Body's
recommendations and rulings, but stated it will require "a reasonable
period of time" to do so and will consult with the European
Communities and Japan. On November 17, 2000, both the European
Communities and Japan requested arbitration under Article 21.3(c)
of the DSU to determine "a reasonable period of time" under the
circumstances.' 3 3 These dispute settlement proceedings, thus, are
yet to be completed.
From the Author's perspective, it seems that the United States
has little leeway in carrying out its avowed intent to implement the
Dispute Settlement Body's recommendations and rulings except by
repealing the 1916 Act, as the panel in the Japan Report suggested.
At one level, given that the 1916 Act has rarely been employed and
never successfully so, and further in light of the ready availability
and effectiveness of the antidumping statute-Title VII of the Tariff
Act of 1930, repeal of the 1916 Act should not adversely affect the
United States or its domestic industries that are experiencing the
injurious effects of dumping.
On the other hand, as posited at the outset of this Commentary,
the truly noteworthy aspect of these dispute settlements is the likely
ultimate outcome-the striking down of a U.S. statute over eighty
years old due to the deliberations of the WTO's dispute settlement
process under public international law. That precedent could prove
to be more problematic in the future if another U.S. law of more
practical importance to the United States likewise comes under
attack before the WTO. To the extent the United States follows
through with repeal of the 1916 Act-as it has indicated-and
another country's domestic law is found to violate the GATT 1994,
the United States can legitimately point to this precedent as grounds
for that other Member State respecting and acting on the Dispute
Settlement Body's recommendations and rulings.
As a final observation, it can reasonably be said that the panel
and Appellate Body acquitted themselves well. Their reports are
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thorough and thoughtful and skillfully build on basic principles
under GATT, WTO, and public international law to reach a solidly
defensible result. While the United States appropriately did its
utmost to achieve a victory in favor of maintaining the 1916 Act, the
WTO's dispute settlement process as it operated here leaves the
impression that the contentions and positions advanced by the
United States were honestly and objectively considered by the panel
and Appellate Body. This deliberate even-handedness should
strengthen the legitimacy of the WTO's dispute settlement system
and reinforce the faith of the Member States as a group that their
decision to entrust so much jurisdiction to the WTO has been welltaken.

